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Global Legal Triage in Response to the 
2009 H1N1 Outbreak 
James G. Hodge, Jr.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION1 
Considered by many public health authorities to be a mere 
“glancing” blow to global health,2 the 2009 H1N1 (swine) flu 
pandemic did not present the type of cataclysmic threat some 
initially feared.3 Still, the spread of H1N1 flu globally 
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Bloomberg School of Public Health; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center; Senior Scholar, Centers for Law and the Public’s 
Health: A Collaborative at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities. 
 1. This article is based in part on James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. 
Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public Health 
Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249 (2008) and James G. Hodge, 
Jr., Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies and Disasters, 58 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 627 (2006). While these articles provide an existing foundation for 
defining legal triage on a domestic level, this manuscript extends these 
concepts to the global arena, specifically in response to the H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. The author acknowledges the editing and research assistance of 
Ron Ordell, J.D., Brian Harel, J.D., PhD, and Aubrey Joy Corcoran, J.D., 
M.P.H, as well as Christopher Stringham and Sarah O’Keefe, J.D. Candidates, 
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. 
 2. Although mortality related to H1N1 largely shifted to a different 
group than routine, annual flu outbreaks, deaths related to H1N1 may 
actually be less severe than those during a normal flu season. See Editor’s 
Summary, Anne M. Presanis et al., The Severity of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza 
in the United States, from April to July 2009: A Bayesian Analysis, PLOS 
MED., Dec. 2009, at 1,12 (estimating 6,000 deaths from H1N1 in the U.S. 
through November 2009, which is lower than similar deaths caused by 
seasonal influenza in an average year, while explaining that H1N1 victims are 
younger, however, than the estimated 36,000 persons who die per year in the 
U.S. from seasonal influenza). 
 3. See Christophe Fraser et al., Pandemic Potential of a Strain of 
Influenza A (H1N1): Early Findings, 324 SCIENCE 1557, 1557 (2009) 
(reporting that H1N1 flu severity is less than the Influenza Pandemic of 1918 
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represents the first major communicable disease threat of the 
millennium. It resulted in the first ever declaration of a public 
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) by the 
World Health Organization (WHO),4 the initial widespread use 
of the newly-revised international health regulations (IHRs),5 
and an international response effort that featured multiple 
declarations of national or regional emergencies.6 The 
pandemic also offered an opportunity to assess how the global 
public health system responds to transnational communicable 
disease threats in the modern era. 
In many ways, the global health system has triumphed. 
Within weeks of its detection in Mexico, H1N1 influenza 
became a global concern.7 International surveillance 
coordinated by WHO, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), and others began almost immediately.8 
                                                 
and comparable to flu in 1957); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Reaction to Swine 
Flu: Apt and Lucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A1 (describing the virus as 
“only rarely lethal”). 
 4. Press Release, Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Swine 
Influenza, (Apr. 25, 2009) available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090425/en/ind
ex.html (announcing the declaration of a PHEIC); see also David P. Fidler, The 
Swine Flu Outbreak and International Law, 13 ASIL INSIGHTS Apr. 27, 2009, 
http://www.asil.org/insights090427.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 5. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Influenza A(H1N1) and Pandemic 
Preparedness Under the Rule of International Law, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
2376, 2376 (2009); Rebecca Katz, Use of Revised International Health 
Regulations During Influenza A (H1N1) Epidemic, 2009, 15 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1165, 1166–68 (2009); Fidler, supra note 4. 
 6. See, e.g.,  Press Release, Charles E. Johnson, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., Determination that a Public Health Emergency 
Exists (Apr. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/h1n1emergency042609.html; see 
generally Pub. Health L. & Pol’y Program, Ariz. St. Univ., Global Legal Triage 
and the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak, http://www.law.asu.edu/?id=2036 (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2010) (providing a list of state, federal, and international declarations 
of emergency or public health emergency). 
 7. Focus: Swine Flu, Timeline: H1N1 Outbreak, ALJAZEERA.NET, June 
15,      2009, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/05/200952105136198276.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 8. See Katz, supra note 5, at 1166–67 (describing contact between 
Mexico, Canada, the United States and WHO during the early detection of the 
illness); Press Release, World Health Org., Influenza-like Illness in the United 
States and Mexico (Apr. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en/index.html (stating that since 
Mexican authorities began detecting the illness on March 18, “the World 
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Isolates of the H1N1 virus were shared internationally.9 
Sources of transmission were rapidly detected. Those at 
greatest risks of morbidity or mortality from H1N1 were 
identified.10 National pandemic flu plans and 
interjurisdictional agreements developed by WHO member 
countries over the prior decade were operationalized.11 Public 
and private sector response efforts were well-coordinated in 
many countries. Treatment protocols were developed and 
antiviral resources like oseltamivir12 were allocated to ensure 
medical care for those at risk of serious complications.13 People 
with natural immunities, stemming most likely from their 
exposure to the Spanish flu of 1918 or other flues, were 
identified.14 A safe and effective vaccine was quickly prepared, 
tested for human use, and available on the market within 
months.15 And perhaps most importantly, public health 
education led to temporary changes in individual behaviors to 
stymie the flu’s spread and impact.16 Countless infections were 
                                                 
Health Organization has been in constant contact” with Mexican health 
authorities). 
 9. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Opening Remarks at 
the Intergovernmental Meeting on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing 
of Influenza Viruses, Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits (May 15, 2009) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2009/pandemic_influenza_preparedness_2009
0515/en/index.html). 
 10. See Press Release, World Health Org., Clinical Features of Severe 
Cases of Pandemic Influenza: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Briefing Note 13 (Oct. 
16, 2009) available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_clinical_features_2009101
6/en/index.html (describing the groups most at risk from H1N1 as “pregnant 
women, . . . children younger than 2 years of age, and people with chronic lung 
disease, including asthma”). 
 11. Katz, supra note 5, at 1166. 
     12. U.S. National Library of Medicine, Medline Plus, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a699040.html (last visited 
May 5, 2010). 
 13. See id. at 1168. But see David Boutolleau et al., Letter to the Editor, 
Detection of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Virus in Patients Treated with 
Oseltamivir, 16 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 351, 351 (2010) (raising 
questions about “potential virus transmission during antiviral treatment and 
the possible resistance of pandemic (H1N1) to oseltamivir”). 
 14. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Says Older People Appear Safer from 
Virus, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at A30. 
 15. See Denise Grady, Review Shows Safety of H1N1 Vaccine, Officials 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, at A13. 
 16. See Rick Hampson, H1N1 Flu Spreading Changes in Behavior: 
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avoided and thousands of lives were saved through these and 
other efforts. 
In other ways, however, the global public health system 
has failed despite widespread international planning, 
preparedness, and response efforts. While international 
surveillance commenced immediately, accurate assessments of 
the prevalence of H1N1 remain sketchy.17 Global counts of 
persons infected with this strain of flu are mere estimates. At-
risk individuals in many countries, including pregnant women 
and children in developed countries like the United States, 
were not able to access preventive measures, including  
vaccines, when they needed them most.18 Persons at risk in 
developing countries had essentially no chance to be 
vaccinated.19’20 Antiquated techniques slowed vaccine 
manufacturing, leading to an immediate global allocation 
crisis.21 Even when vaccines became available, their 
distribution was marred by international battles over who 
would receive supplies first, infighting over its allocation within 
countries, and gross failures to distribute to those most at 
risk.22 In essence, emergency response efforts could not stop the 
natural spread of flu, nor could public health interventions 
protect those most at risk in many countries. Had H1N1 
resembled a more potent strain capable of killing victims with 
                                                 
Prevention-minded Adopt New Policies, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2009, at A1. 
 17. See Press Release, World Health Org., Pandemic (H1N1) 2009–Update 
83 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2010_01_15/en/index.html. 
 18. See Andrew Pollack & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Road to Flu Vaccine 
Shortfall, Paved with Undue Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2009, at A1 
(describing the shortfalls in the United States government’s original estimates 
for vaccine supply availability). 
 19. See, e.g., Gboyega Akinsanmi & Steve Dada, Nigeria: Swine Flu–
’Vaccine Not Available’, ALLAFRICA, Jan. 20, 2010, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201001200317.html (noting that as of January 20, 
2010, government authorities in Lagos, Nigeria, had “no vaccine to treat the 
flu virus in stock” despite the recent death of a thirty-eight-year-old woman 
and the positive tests of eight other people in the area). 
 20. See Martin Enserink, Developing Countries to Get Some H1N1 
Vaccine–But When?, 326 SCIENCE 782, 782 (2009). 
 21. See Pollack & McNeil, Jr., supra note 18, at A13. 
 22. See Enserink, supra note 20; Tan Ee Lyn, Asia Worries over H1N1 Flu 
Vaccine Production, REUTERS, May 18, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUST208264 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) 
(reporting that Indonesia and India were worried about their access to vaccine 
produced predominantly in Europe and the United States). 
HODGE_MACROS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2010  2:33 PM 
2010] GLOBAL LEGAL TRIAGE 603 
 
the ease of H5N1 (avian) flu, the global health impact would 
have been considerably worse.23 
If H1N1 was a “test” run of the modern global public health 
system,24 then the system has fallen short. Significant response 
efforts globally could not stop the inevitable march of a highly 
communicable and potentially deadly virus. Millions contracted 
H1N1 within weeks of its detection,25 hundreds were reported 
dead,26 and others have suffered economically, 27 emotionally, 
or mentally.28 Lingering questions remain as to the reasons for 
these failures to control infectious diseases globally during 
public health emergencies. Many factors are at play–
inadequate or non-existent public health surveillance systems 
in many countries, pre-existing lack of access to medical 
services, insufficient medical personnel, lack of medical 
treatment and supplies, and ill-designed vaccine distribution 
systems. Costs and public apathy in some countries are also to 
blame. Greece, for example, recently cancelled orders for an 
additional 12 million doses of H1N1 vaccine in the face of 
national budget deficits,29 even though only approximately 3% 
                                                 
 23. Accord Presanis, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that study estimates 
placed the H1N1 epidemic “within the lowest category of severity considered 
in pandemic planning conducted prior to the appearance of [the virus] in the 
United States”). 
 24. See Thom Patterson, Canada’s Olympic-Sized Plan to Fight H1N1, 
CNN, Jan. 18, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/01/13/olympics.flu.preps/ (last visited Apr. 
8, 2010) (warning that the potential for H1N1 to re-emerge in the Spring of 
2010 remains a possibility especially during international gatherings like the 
Winter Olympics in Vancouver). 
 25. Mick Stobbe, CDC Reports 20 Percent of Americans Got Swine Flu 
Vaccine, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2010, at A5. (estimating 55 million became ill 
and 246,000 were hospitalized); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2009 H1N1 Early Outbreak and Disease Characteristics, (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/surveillanceqa.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) 
(estimating that over 1 million became ill between April and June 2009).  
 26. Stobbe, supra note 25. 
 27. See P.J. Huffstutter, Swine Flu? Please Don’t Call It That: Hog 
Farmers, Already Hurting from the Recession, Say H1N1 Paranoia Has 
Devastated Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, at A22 (reporting that the pork 
industry has lost $1.5 billion since the virus was reported in April). 
 28. See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., A Hidden Epidemic: The Legal 
Environment Underlying Mental and Behavioral Health Preparedness in 
Public Health Emergencies, __ ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. REV __ (2010) (forthcoming) 
(on file with author). 
 29. Harry Papachristou, Greece Halts Purchases of H1N1 Flu Vaccines, 
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, 
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of its population is vaccinated.30 Despite H1N1’s potential to 
kill, many people in developed countries like the United States 
chose to forego vaccination even when vaccines became 
plentiful.31 Elsewhere, countries ,where population threats like 
malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malnourishment are 
mainstays, did not prioritize H1N1 prevention.32 
At least partially responsible for global inadequacies in 
H1N1 responses are divergent legal responses authorizing a 
range of antiquated, inconsistent, and uncoordinated public 
health prevention and control measures. As explained in Part 
II, while WHO and multiple member countries declared 
various emergencies in response to H1N1, these declarations 
authorized an array of measures that were not always well-
targeted or well-implemented in controlling pandemic flu. 
Worse still, some WHO member countries’ emergency laws 
authorized government to act in ways that diverge from 
principles of public health practice, science, ethics, and human 
rights. WHO’s implementation of the IHRs, intended to provide 
internationally-consistent standards for public health 
emergency responses, did not necessarily guide the 
independent exercise of national or regional emergency powers 
among sovereign governments. Significant global health 
objectives became mired in disputes over legal responsibility, 
national sovereignty, and trade policies. Part III explains that 
the resulting global legal quagmire is attributable in part to 
failures in what I refer to as “global legal triage.” Defined 
essentially as those efforts among international and national 
leaders, legal counsel, and others to identify, prioritize, and 
                                                 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE60I0RI20100119 (last visited Apr. 8, 
2010). 
 30. S. Tsiodras et al., The Vaccination Campaign Against 2009 Pandemic 
Influenza A(H1N1) and Its Continued Importance in View of the Uncertainty 
Surrounding the Risk Associated with the Pandemic, EUROSURVEILLANCE, 
Jan. 21, 2010, at 10, 10. 
 31. See Perri Klass, Fearing a Flu Vaccine, and Wanting More of It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at D5 (describing public fear of the H1N1 vaccine). 
 32. See Luis Gomes Sambo, Reg’l Dir. for Afr., World Health Org., Address 
at the Opening of the African Conference on Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) 
2009 (Aug. 11, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.afro.who.int/en/rdo/speeches/1858-speech-by-dr-luis-gomes-sambo-
at-the-opening-of-the-african-conference-on-pandemic-influenza-ah1n1.html) 
(noting the difficulty of shifting funds to H1N1 preparedness from competing 
public health priorities). 
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solve transnational public health legal issues to improve global 
health outcomes in real-time emergencies,33 global legal triage 
is essential to protecting global health. National laws are core 
to emergency responses, but do not allow for the type of 
sustained, organized international responses that lead directly 
to improved global health outcomes. What is missing 
internationally is an enforceable global legal strategy that 
prioritizes key decisions designed to protect the health of 
populations beyond national borders. A brief conclusion follows. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS OF EMERGENCIES 
Laws are indispensable to effective emergency response 
efforts.34 On the national level, country-specific laws create the 
public health infrastructure through which governments 
detect, declare, and address emergencies. Laws determine not 
only what constitutes a public health emergency, but also how 
to respond through public and private actors.35 Assessing the 
legal environment in declared states of public health 
emergency, however, is complicated. Significant legal 
challenges emerge nationally from the convergence of response 
efforts of varied entities (e.g., public health agencies, 
emergency management agencies, hospitals, non-profit 
institutions) and actors (e.g., public health practitioners, health 
care workers, law enforcers) at multiple levels of government 
(e.g., national, regional, and local). Existing laws must be 
interpreted and applied in real time during emergencies.36 New 
laws and policies are triggered by or flow from the emergency 
                                                 
 33. This definition is based in part on the existing definition of “legal 
triage” applicable in domestic legal responses and espoused most recently as: 
“those efforts by public health legal practitioners during declared emergencies 
to ‘prioritize legal issues and solutions in real time that facilitate legitimate 
public health responses.’” Hodge & Anderson, supra note 1, at 273 (citing 
Hodge, supra note 1, at 631). This definition uses the term “triage” consistent 
with its general meaning as “a process in which things are ranked in terms of 
importance or priority[.]” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1840 (4th ed. 2000). 
 34. Anthony D. Moulton et al., What Is Public Health Legal 
Preparedness?, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 672, 672, 674–75, 681 (2003). 
 35. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Assessing the Legal Environment Concerning 
Mass Casualty Event Planning and Response, in MASS MEDICAL CARE WITH 
SCARCE RESOURCES: A COMMUNITY PLANNING GUIDE 25, 27–29 (Sally J. 
Phillips & Ann Knebel eds. 2006), available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/mce/mceguide.pdf. 
 36. See id. at 26. 
HODGE_MACROS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2010  2:33 PM 
606 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:2 
 
 
declaration itself.37 While advance knowledge of emergency 
jurisprudence’s principles can help to answer many issues, 
unique legal problems stem from the specific circumstances of 
any emergency. These emerging legal dilemmas are not  easily 
resolved within any country during a public health emergency. 
Now consider how these challenges escalate when a major 
communicable disease threat goes global. Viral flu strains like 
H1N1 do not respect international boundaries. In a global 
economy with hundreds of thousands of persons and millions of 
goods traversing continents daily, the spread of easily-
communicated diseases like H1N1 are predictable and 
inevitable. It took only a few weeks for H1N1 to transition from 
a localized threat to a global pandemic.38 Yet, emergency legal 
responses among countries are less predictable. International 
standards issued by WHO, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and others on how to respond to global health threats 
(1) allow significant deviations based on national 
interpretations of law, policy, and science, and (2) respect 
international variances in legal systems, politics, and cultures. 
As a result, one country’s public health legal responses do not 
necessarily mimic another’s, which leads to legal differences in 
response capabilities. Resulting failures to effectively respond 
to global health threats like H1N1 in some countries increase 
risks for populations in other nations (even if those other 
nations are working extensively to control emerging disease 
threats).39 
                                                 
 37. See Hodge, supra note 1, at 634–40 (describing various declarations 
that can be issued at the state and federal levels and how those declarations 
change their respective legal environments). 
 38. Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., World Now at the Start 
of 2009 Influenza Pandemic U.N. Doc. SG/SM/12309 (June 11, 2009) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase
6_20090611/en/index.html). 
 39. See Tikki Pang & G. Emmanuel Guindon, Globalization and Risks to 
Health, 5 EMBO REP.(SPECIAL ISSUE) S11, S14–15 (2004) (describing the 
importance of revamping IHR to meet global challenges);  Lawrence Gostin, 
Fighting the Flu With One Hand Tied, WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, at A21 
(noting that viruses often originate in Asia or other poor regions where 
detection capabilities are not as advanced as those in wealthier nations); Ban 
Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., United Nations, Address to the Forum on Global Health: 
The Tie That Binds (June 15, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sgsm12309.doc.htm) (noting the 
necessity of a global coordinated response to H1N1). 
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Ill-advised legal responses to transnational risks may be 
hastily crafted in real-time in ways that are detrimental to 
global health, trade, and populations. For example, at the 
inception of the H1N1 pandemic in April 2009, authorities in 
China used their quarantine laws to sequester a group of 
seventy or so Mexican tourists visiting their country.40 Some of 
these individuals and others were held for several days at a 
local hotel41 even though there was insufficient information to 
suggest they had H1N1 or had been exposed to individuals 
believed to be infected with the virus. Additional countries like 
Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and Cuba issued legal mandates to 
temporarily cancel all outgoing flights to Mexico,42 even though 
WHO recommended against similar travel restrictions.43 Cuban 
authorities reportedly also authorized military soldiers and 
other personnel to close highways, isolate neighborhoods, and 
go door-to-door to enforce mandatory quarantines and 
evacuations door-to-door as needed.44 The Tunisian government 
prohibited its citizens from traveling to Mecca in October for 
the annual pilgrimage because of a lack of H1N1 vaccine.45 
Russian and other national authorities blatantly violated WTO 
policies by banning all pork imports from the United States and 
other countries for a limited time, despite the lack of a public 
health justification for the ban (because H1N1 cannot be spread 
through the consumption of pork products).46 Despite the lack 
of any substantiated threat to the public’s health, the Egyptian 
government ordered the slaughter of several hundred thousand 
pigs at the onset of the pandemic, at significant cost to local 
                                                 
 40. Andrew Browne, China Forces Dozens of Mexican Travelers into 
Quarantine, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2009, at A14. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Marc Lacey & Andrew Jacobs, Even as Fears of Flu Ebb, Mexicans 
Feel Stigma, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Mexican 
diplomats were angered by the suspension of flights from Mexico by four Latin 
American nations—Argentina, Peru, Ecuador and Cuba—in response to the 
flu outbreak). 
 43. Browne, supra note 40. 
 44. James Anderson, The Flu Pandemic: Cuban Civil Defense Teams Keep 
Flu at Bay, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 4, 2009, at 23. 
 45. Citizens Barred from Making Hajj, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A28. 
 46. Jonathan Lynn, Swine Flu Alert Prompts Pork Import Bans, REUTERS, 
Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN27548150 (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2010). 
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farmers who were not paid for their losses.47 
Although these examples are limited to specific 
jurisdictions, they exemplify a fundamental weakness of global 
legal efforts to respond to H1N1 flu. Specifically, there is no 
definitive, enforceable legal framework to control emergency, 
communicable disease threats globally. As discussed below, the 
most comprehensive, modern approach to controlling infectious 
diseases has been developed by the WHO in the 2005 revision 
of its International Health Regulations (IHRs). Though 
extensive, purposeful, and endorsed by WHO member 
countries,48 the central flaw of the IHRs remains their 
enforceability.49 The regulations constitute a guide more than a 
legal mandate during pandemics. National emergency and 
public health laws govern in default. As documented in Table 
1, below, however, emergency laws and responses among 
sovereign countries vary extensively. In combination, 
implementation of international and national  laws to address 
global health threats like H1N1 in real-time emergencies is at 
best reactionary. 
A. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
REGULATIONS 
On April 25, 2009, at the inception of the H1N1 pandemic, 
WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan sought the counsel 
of WHO’s Emergency Committee and quickly declared a public 
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) pursuant 
to the IHRs.50 The Director-General’s decision was preemptive 
and unprecedented. This was the first time that WHO declared 
a PHEIC under its new, revised standards.51 
                                                 
 47. Gostin, supra note 5, at 2378; Egypt Orders Slaughter of All Pigs over 
Swine Flu: No Cases Reported in the Country; Some Farmers Refusing to 
Cooperate, MSNBC, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30480507/ 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 48. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT 
THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/FAQ2009.pdf (explaining that IHR are binding 
on all countries, including all WHO member states). 
 49. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 2377 (stating that failure to comply with 
norms was a reason behind the revision to the IHR, however the new 
regulations also provide little enforcement authority to the WHO). 
 50. Press Release, Chan, supra note 4. 
 51. Katz, supra note 5, at 1167. 
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Finalized by the World Health Assembly on May 23, 2005 
following lessons learned during the 2003 Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, 52 a revamped version 
of the IHRs only became effective on June 15, 2007.53 Shedding 
the antiquated premises of its original conception in the 1960s, 
the modern purpose of the IHRs are to “prevent, protect 
against, control, and provide a public health response to the 
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate 
with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid 
unnecessary interference with international traffic and 
trade.”54 In setting international standards for disease control 
and prevention, the new IHRs reject the disease-specific 
approach of prior iterations (which focused only on three 
diseasescholera, plague, and yellow fever)55 and adopt an “all 
hazards” approach.56 The revised IHRs apply broadly to 
naturally occurring infectious diseases, chemical or radiological 
elements, bioterrorism, and other global threats to the public’s 
health.57 
The IHRs provide a host of public health powers to control 
these threats, including international public health 
surveillance, vaccinations, medical examinations, quarantine, 
isolation, and restrictions on human travelers and trade.58 
Coextensively, they incorporate human rights norms in 
counter-balance to the use of these and other public health 
powers. Human rights protections include the need to respect 
human dignity and freedoms, provide a right to health for 
quarantined or isolated individuals, protect against 
unwarranted discrimination, ensure transparency, and 
                                                 
 52. See David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International 
Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and 
Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 85 (2006). 
 53. Jessica L. Sturtevant et al., The New International Health 
Regulations: Considerations for Global Public Health Surveillance, 1 DISASTER 
MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 117, 117 (2007). 
 54. World Health Org., International Health Regulations  (2005), at art. 1, 
WHA58.3, (May 23, 2005) [hereinafter IHR (2005)]. 
 55. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 48, at 1. 
 56. See IHR (2005), at art. 1 (defining “disease” as encompassing any 
illness or medical condition “that presents or could present a significant harm 
to humans). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at arts. 5, 23, 31. 
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promote privacy of identifiable health data.59 Before a public 
health measure may restrict civil or political human rights, the 
IHRs have been interpreted to require that the measure60 
must: “(1) respond to a pressing public or social need; (2) 
pursue a legitimate aim; (3) be proportionate to the legitimate 
aim; and (4) be no more restrictive than necessary to achieve 
the purpose sought by restricting the right.”61 Though 
meaningful, human rights protections under the IHRs fall 
short in two key ways. First, due process protections in the use 
of compulsory public health powers are not explicitly spelled 
out.62 Second, a human rights requirement to employ least 
restrictive alternatives to coercive public health powers applies 
only to the use of medical exams, not other compulsory powers 
like vaccination, isolation, or quarantine.63 
WHO member countries are required to notify WHO of 
events constituting a PHEIC within twenty-four hours of their 
receipt of evidence that  identifies an extraordinary event 
which is determined to (1) “constitute a public health risk to 
other states through the international spread of disease”; and 
(2) “potentially require a coordinated international 
response[.]”64 As unusual instances of respiratory, flu-like 
illnesses began to emerge in March 2009, Mexican health 
authorities properly notified the Pan-American Health 
Organization (PAHO), the regional arm of WHO covering the 
Americas.65 PAHO transmitted these data to WHO in 
Geneva.66 Once a PHEIC is declared, WHO’s Director-General 
can: 
 
 Independently assess and verify disease prevalence in 
                                                 
 59. See id. at arts. 3, 32, 42, 45. 
 60. See Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 87. 
 61. Id. (citing U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’m on 
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the 
Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, ¶¶ 10–11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sep. 28, 1984)). 
 62. See IHR (2005), at art. 23 (stating that no health measure under the 
IHR shall be carried out except in accordance with the law and international 
obligations of the State Party). 
 63. See id. at art. 23. 
 64. See id. at arts. 1, 6. 
 65. Katz, supra note 5, at 1166. 
 66. See id. at 1167. 
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countries with assistance from non-governmental 
organizations; 
 Share data with other countries to help with 
international response efforts; and 
 Issue temporary (non-binding) recommendations to 
countries on the most appropriate ways to respond, 
including health measures to be taken by affected 
countries and countries not directly affected.67 
 
Countries may follow WHO’s guidance in their discretion. 
The IHRs stipulate only that countries must not (1) mandate 
invasive procedures as a condition of entry for any traveler; (2) 
require health documentation for travelers other than those 
authorized in the IHRs or by WHO;68 (3) impose health 
measures that are more restrictive than the IHRs without 
adequate scientific or WHO guidance; or (4) unnecessarily 
restrict international traffic or trade.69 
The primary flaw of the IHRs are not WHO’s failure to set 
forth reasonably sound provisions for international disease 
control. Throughout the H1N1 pandemic, WHO worked with 
real-time surveillance information to generate guidance for 
global emergency response efforts based on existing public 
health science and practice. The problem lies in their 
enforcement. The IHRs provide guidance, not mandates.70 
Compliance with the regulations is essentially voluntary,71 
although member states have strong incentives to adhere to 
retain their WHO status and avoid public censure. Yet there 
                                                 
 67. See IHR (2005), at arts. 10, 12, 15–17. 
 68. See id. at art 23. Concerning international travelers, countries may 
require for public health purposes, upon departure or arrival, information on 
the traveler’s destination or itinerary; a non-invasive medical examination; 
and inspection of bags, cargo, containers, mail, and human remains. Id. 
Pursuant to Article 31, “invasive medical examinations, vaccination or other 
prophylaxis shall not be required as a condition of entry” unless they are (1) 
“necessary to determine whether a public health risk exists;” (2) a condition of 
entry for a traveler seeking temporary or permanent residence; (3) consistent 
with country-specific health measures that comply with Article 43; or (4) 
implemented consistent with Article 23. Id. at arts. 31, 43. 
 69. See id. at art. 43. 
 70. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 2377. 
 71. See Sturtevant et al., supra note 53, at 120 (“The WHO has no formal 
means by which to enforce the IHR.”); Gostin, supra note 39 (“[T]he 
frightening truth is that the WHO has no real power”). 
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are no direct funds, even for the poorest nations, accompanying 
national endorsements of the IHRs.72 Nor do the IHRs require 
member countries to build national surveillance capacity.73 
Furthermore, as a concession to national sovereignty, the IHRs 
specifically allow countries to legislate in pursuit of their own 
health policies under principles of national law, 
notwithstanding inconsistencies with the Regulations’  
standards.74 As discussed below, this is exactly what countries 
have done. 
B. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS 
Within any country there is a slate of emergency laws and 
policies that may be triggered through declarations of states of 
emergency, disaster, public health emergency, or other terms.75 
In the United States, multiple federal laws address 
emergencies, including those arising from public health 
threats.76 Federal laws authorize declarations of (1) a general 
emergency, (2) a disaster, and (3) a public health emergency. 
Declarations of emergency77 or disaster78 authorized by the 
                                                 
 72. See IHR (2005), at arts. 5, 13 (suggesting that countries develop, 
strengthen, and maintain core public health capacities to detect, assess, notify, 
and report events, and to respond promptly and effectively to public health 
risks and emergencies of international concern); see also Gostin, supra note 5, 
at 2377 (“[P]recious little has been devoted to build [surveillance and 
response] capacity in poor countries.”). 
 73. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 88 (“The new IHR also contain no 
obligations on states parties to provide financial and technical resources to 
support capacity-building.”). 
 74. See Fidler, supra note 4 (“The IHR 2005 do not preclude States Parties 
from implementing measures that achieve a greater level of health protection 
than WHO temporary recommendations . . . .”). 
 75. While there are important distinctions between the terms disaster, 
emergency, public health emergency, or like terms as used in existing 
statutory or regulatory frameworks, this article does not attempt to delineate 
these distinctions for the purposes of emergency responses to public health 
threats like H1N1. For more information concerning U.S. distinctions among 
these terms, see Hodge & Anderson, supra note 1, at 255–69. 
 76. See id. at 255–63 (documenting the extensive range of federal laws 
implicated in national emergencies). 
 77. In general, the President can declare a state of emergency under the 
Stafford Act only after a state governor requests federal assistance “to save 
lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert 
the threat of a catastrophe. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 5122(1), 5191 (2006). What 
constitutes an emergency is broad and may apply to a wide range of incidents. 
For example, President Clinton declared a state of emergency in 2000 to 
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Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act,79 must be issued by the President.80 Pursuant to the Public 
Health Service Act,81 the declaration of a public health 
emergency may be issued by the Secretary of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS).82 In response to the 
national threat of H1N1, DHHS declared a state of public 
health emergency on April 26, 2009.83 Only later, on October 
23, 2009, did President Obama declare a state of national 
emergency.84 Together, these declarations changed the legal 
                                                 
contain West Nile Virus in New York and New Jersey. SARAH A. LISTER, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL 
RESPONSE TO DISASTERS: FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND FUNDING 4 (2007). Once 
declared, the Stafford Act provides the President with expansive power to 
authorize temporary housing, to provide financial assistance for individuals, 
and to issue new rules and regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 5192 (2006). 
 78. The President can declare a state of disaster pursuant to the Stafford 
Act upon the request of a governor during a more extreme crisis involving: 
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, 
high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, 
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, 
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the 
United States, which in the determination of the President causes 
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major 
disaster assistance . . . to supplement the efforts and available 
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief 
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering 
caused thereby. 
42 U.S.C. § 5122(2), 5170 (2006). During a declared disaster, federal agencies 
may support local and state response efforts, but can also directly coordinate 
response efforts of federal agencies, private entities, and state and local 
governments. Id. at § 5170a. 
 79. Id. at §§ 5121–5205. 
 80. Id. at §§ 5170, 5191. 
 81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300 (2006). 
 82. Id. at § 247d(a). “Public health emergency” is not specifically defined 
in the Act. Instead, DHHS’s Secretary has wide discretion to determine when 
“a disease or disorder presents a public health emergency; or . . . a public 
health emergency, including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or 
bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists . . . .” Id.  Upon declaration, the Secretary 
can make or enter grants or contracts, provide awards for expenses, and 
conduct and support investigations into the cause, treatment, or prevention of 
a disease or disorder. Id.; see generally Jennifer Ray, Federal Declaration of a 
Public Health Emergency, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 251 (2009) 
(describing the procedure for and legal events that accompany declaration of a 
public health emergency). 
 83. Press Release, Johnson, supra note 6. 
 84. Proclamation No. 8443, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,439 (Oct. 23, 2009). 
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landscape for H1N1 response efforts nationally,85 authorizing 
various federal powers to acquire and distribute resources and 
requiring federal agencies like DHHS and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)86 to coordinate national response 
efforts. 
Other countries’ emergency declarations in response to 
H1N1 empower their emergency management, public health, 
and law enforcement authorities to respond in different ways. 
The table below provides a brief synopsis of select countries’ 
emergency declarations and resulting legal powers. 
 
Table. Select Examples of National Emergency 
Declarations in Response to H1N1 
 





Government may regulate 
transportation; suspend 
public events; enter any home 
or building for inspection; 
order quarantines; and assign 
authorities and health 
professionals to conduct 
certain tasks. Thomas Black, 
Mexico’s Calderon Declares 
Emergency amid Swine Flu 
Outbreak, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
Apr. 25, 2009, 
                                                 
 85. See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Brooke Courtney, Assessing the Legal 
Standard of Care in Public Health Emergencies, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 361, 
361 (2010) (stating that after declarations of a national emergency and public 
health emergency in response to H1N1, DHHS was authorized “to waive or 
conditionally set aside or modify certain federal program requirements and 
disable federal law requiring hospitals to screen patients seeking emergency 
services on site”). 
 86. DHS is responsible for organizing federal response capabilities 
through the formulation of the National Response Plan (NRP) to manage 
domestic incidents across all levels of government through prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery activities. Press Release, Office of the 
Press Sec’y, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-5 (Feb. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html. The NRP was recently 
superseded by the National Response Framework (“NRF”) in March 2008. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK  2–3, 79 
(2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 
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DHHS may take such action 
as appropriate including: 
making grants; providing 
awards for expenses; entering 
into contracts; and 
conducting and supporting 
investigations into the cause, 
treatment, or prevention of a 
disease. http://www.hhs.gov 
/secretary/phe_swh1n1.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 
DHHS may temporarily 
waive or modify certain 
requirements of Medicare or 
Medicaid reimbursement 
policies, as well as 
requirements under the State 
Children’s Insurance 
Program, the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor 
Act (EMTALA), and the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
Proclamation No. 8443, 74 






Government may budget and 
distribute special resources to 
contain and mitigate the 
impact of H1N1. Adriaan 
Alsema, Columbia Declares 
State of Emergency over 
Swine Flu Threat, COLOMBIA 












Government may reinforce 
prevention, vigilance, and 
medical attention; health 
officials may issue restrictive 
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measures to prevent the 
illness from spreading. 
Government Declares a 
Health Emergency in Costa 
Rica, INSIDE COSTA RICA, 
Apr. 29, 2009,  
http://insidecostarica.com/dail
ynews/2009/april/29/nac01.ht





Government shall coordinate 
efforts and to take necessary 
measures; bar entry by 
foreigners who have been to 
Mexico and suspend charter 
flights to Mexico. Ecuador 
Declares State of Emergency 
Due to Swine Flu Alert, 












Government activates an 
inter-agency committee to 
develop and implement 
emergency plans for rapid 
and appropriate care. Enact 
National Health Emergency 
Nicaragua: Interinstitutional 
Commission is reactive with 
human influenza, NICARAGUA 




les;id=57516 (last visited May 






Government may order any 
person to treatment, 
immunization, isolation or 
observation, as well as order 
the destruction of structures 
that are incapable of being 
thoroughly disinfected. 
A(H1N1): 2 More Die, Health 
Curfew if Mortality Rate 
Reaches 0.4pc, STAR ONLINE, 
Aug. 17, 2009, 
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Government required all 
educational institutions 
closed for several weeks and 
advised against public 
against gatherings. 
Afghanistan declares H1N1 
Emergency, Shuts Schools, 





Of those countries that formally declared states of 
emergency, most relied on general emergency powers tailored 
to address specific public health threats. Other countries, 
including Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the United 
States, declared specific states of health emergency. The timing 
and scope of these general and “health-related” emergency 
declarations are noteworthy. Not surprisingly, Mexico was the 
first country to issue an emergency decree on April 25, 2009.87 
With multiple, identified deaths from H1N1 influenza already 
documented, Mexico’s President Felipe Calderon pledged to 
take “all the measures necessary to respond with efficiency and 
opportunity to this respiratory epidemic.”88 Governmental 
offices, schools, business, theaters, and museums were closed 
for over two weeks.89 The President’s decree also bestowed 
additional authority to control transportation, enter private 
property, and order quarantines.90 
Following the U.S. declaration of public health emergency 
                                                 
 87. Focus: Swine Flu, Timeline: H1N1 Outbreak, ALJAZEERA.NET, June 
15, 2009, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/05/200952105136198276.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 88. Thomas Black, Mexico’s Calderon Declares Emergency amid Swine Flu 
Outbreak, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 25, 2009, 
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?id=20670001&sid=aEsNownABJ6Q&pid=206
01087 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
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on April 26, 2009,91 Colombia issued a state of emergency on 
April 27 despite not identifying a single case of H1N1 in the 
country.92 Colombian authorities in Bogota used their authority 
and infusion of new resources stemming from the declaration to 
prepare for anticipated cases.93 After finding only two domestic 
cases of H1N1 infection, Costa Rica declared a national health 
emergency on April 28, 2009, authorizing the expenditure of 
five million dollars for public health efforts94 and 
recommending that citizens cancel trips to Mexico.95 Like 
Columbia, Ecuador issued a preemptive state of emergency on 
April 29 despite the lack of confirmed cases.96 Unlike Columbia, 
Ecuador immediately instituted a policy prohibiting flights to 
and from Mexico and barring foreigners who had recently 
visited Mexico from entering the country.97 Nicaragua 
President Daniel Ortega issued a largely preemptive decree of 
health emergency on April 29, 2009, noting “[t]he threat is for 
everyone, no country is exempt[.]”98 A month later, on May 29, 
Venezuela issued its declaration of emergency after a single 
case was confirmed.99 
While these countries largely took a preventive approach to 
H1N1 influenza in quickly declaring states of emergency prior 
to or soon after detecting initial cases of H1N1, others largely 
waited to assess the spread and impact of H1N1. Chile did not 
                                                 
 91. See Press Release, Johnson, supra note 6. 
 92. Adriaan Alsema, Columbia Declares State of Emergency over Swine 
Flu Threat, COLOMBIA REPORTS, Apr. 27, 2009, available at 
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/3775-colombia-declares-state-
of-emergency-over-swine-flu-threat.html. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Vanessa I. Garnica, Costa Rica Allots $5 Million to Fight Flu, THE 
TICO TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, available at LexisNexis Academic (last visited May 
3, 2010). 
 95. Francisco Jara, With Two Flu Cases, Cost[a] Rica Calls National 
Health Emergency, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 29, 2009, available at 
LexisNexis Academic (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 96. Ecuador Declares State of Emergency Due to Swine Flu Alert, CHINA 
VIEW, Apr. 29, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
04/30/content_11286242.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Nicaragua in State of Health Emergency for 2 Months over Flu, 
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Apr. 30, 2009, available at LexisNexis Academic 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 99. Venezuela: Venezuela Declares State of Emergency to Avoid A/H1N1 
Spread, THAI PRESS REPORTS, June 1, 2009 (on file with author). 
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issue its health emergency decree until June 14, 2009 after 
identifying two H1N1 deaths and over 2,300 confirmed cases.100 
The Yemeni Ministry of Health declared a state of emergency 
on June 16 in response to its initial cases of H1N1 infections.101 
Health authorities in Yemen targeted air travel as part of its 
prevention strategy, vowing, “[n]o international air passenger 
should be exempt from screening.”102 With over 4,200 confirmed 
cases, Malaysian authorities declared a state of national health 
emergency on August 17, 2009. Its declaration generated a 
series of systematic responses designed to mitigate the further 
spread of H1N1 influenza.103 These included various travel 
warnings, requirements for citizens with flu-like symptoms to 
wear face masks in public, and self-quarantine as needed. 
Authorities suggested that additional measures, including a 
“health curfew” as proposed in Mexico may be implemented.104 
Torn by war, violence, and poverty in the modern era, Afghan 
authorities declared a state of health emergency on November 
2, 2009 after registering more than 300 positive cases of H1N1 
in the country.105 Schools were ordered closed for three weeks, 
106 even though such a social distancing strategy was rejected 
by CDC for implementation in the United States.107 
                                                 
 100. Chile Decrees Emergency Measures After A/H1N1 Infections Reach 
2,337, CHINA VIEW, June 14, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
06/15/content_11544285.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 101. First Swine Flu Case in Yemen Confirmed; Ministry of Health Declares 
Emergency Nationwide, YEMEN POST, June 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=100&SubID=901&Main
Cat=8; World Health Organization, New Influenza A (H1N1) in Eastern 
Mediterranean Region Number of Laboratory-Confirmed Cases and Deaths 
Reported to WHO, available at 
http://reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_sa.nsf/luFullMap/8B3780DA9A323023C12576
030040D7DA/$File/map.pdf?OpenElement (last visited May 4, 2010). 
 102. Salma Ismail, Yemen Reports Five Swine Flu Cases, YEMEN TIMES, 
June 17, 2009, http://yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=30051 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2010) . 
 103. Himanshu Bhatt, A(H1N1): National Health Emergency Declared, 
SUN2SURF: MALAYSIAN SOURCE FOR NEWS & LIFESTYLE, Aug. 17, 2009, 
available at http://www.thesundaily.com/article.cfm?id=37019. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Afghanistan Declares H1N1 Emergency, Shuts Schools, REUTERS, Nov. 
2, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A115V20091102. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Maryn McKenna & Lisa Schnirring, CDC, States Weigh Usefulness of 
School Closures, CIDRAP NEWS, May 4, 2009, 
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Considerable, additional legal activity in response to the 
H1N1 pandemic occurred at the subnational level. In the 
United States, since September 11, 2001, at least twenty-seven 
states108 have legislatively defined and authorized the 
declaration of a “public health emergency.”109 Many of these 
states’ laws mirror provisions in the Model State Emergency 
Health Powers Act (MSEHPA),110 drafted by the Centers for 
Law and the Public’s Health following the anthrax exposures in 
the Fall of 2001.111 MSEHPA offers flexible, model language 
setting forth potential powers for responding to a public health 
emergency.112 During the H1N1 outbreak, governors or other 
                                                 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/may0409sch
ools-jw.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (reporting that school closures were no 
longer effective at preventing spread of the virus). 
 108. These jurisdictions include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 31-9-3 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2009); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 18.05.070(2) (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 36-787 (2009); California, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558 (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2010); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-131 (West Supp. 
2009); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3132 (2005); District of Columbia, 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2304.01 (LexisNexis 2008); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
381.00315(1)(b) (West 2007); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-3(6) (Supp. 2009); 
Illinois, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3305/4 (West 2008); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 135.140(6) (West 2007); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:762(12) (2007); 
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 801 (2004 & Supp. 2009); Maryland, MD 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 14-3A-01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); Massachusetts, 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 17, § 2A (LexisNexis 1999); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 26:13-2 (West 2007); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-10A-3(G) (West 
2003 & Supp. 2009); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-475 (2009); 
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 6104 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); 
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433.441 (West Supp. 2009); South Carolina, 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-130(P) (Supp. 2009); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 34-22-41 (2004); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.003 
(Vernon Supp. 2009); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-23b-102(6) (Supp. 2009); 
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.16 (Supp. 2009) (“public health threat”); 
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.119A.020 (West Supp. 2010); 
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 166.02 (West Supp. 2009); and Wyoming, WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-4-115 (2009). 
 109. See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency 
Health Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally 
Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 622, 622–23, 625 (2002) 
(discussing how MSEHPA authorizes the declaration of a public health 
emergency). 
 110. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctrs. for Law & the 
Public’s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., 2001). 
 111. Gostin et al., supra note 109, at 622–23. 
 112. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m). “Public 
health emergency” is defined as: 
An occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: (1) is 
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leaders in at least twelve states formally declared states of 
emergency or public health emergency.113 Hong Kong, China 
issued its own declaration of public health emergency modeled 
after MSEHPA on May 1, 2009 pursuant to its Prevention and 
Control of Disease Ordinance.114 China’s Shandong Province 
declared a “second-level health emergency” on May 13, 2009.115 
During the month of August, at least five Indian states and 
territories (Maharashtra,116 Tamil Nadu,117 Haryana,118 
                                                 
believed to be caused by . . . (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the appearance of a novel or 
previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin; . . . and 
(2) poses a high probability of . . . (i) a large number of deaths in the affected 
population;(ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the 
affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent 
that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of 
people in the affected population. 
Id. During a public health emergency declared pursuant to MSEHPA, (1) 
government is vested with new and expedited powers such as the ability of a 
state’s governor to suspend the operation of existing laws that may interfere 
with effective emergency responses, id. at § 403(a); (2) individuals are entitled 
to enhanced public health services, such as expedited access to medicines, 
vaccines, or other resources, id. at § 505(d); (3) responders may be authorized 
to act in ways that differ from non-emergency situations, including practicing 
medicine with out-of-state licenses, id. at § 608; and, (4) volunteers and other 
emergency responders are protected from some forms of civil liability, id. at § 
804(b). 
 113. Pub. Health L. & Pol’y Program, Ariz. St. Univ., supra note 6. Those 
states are as follows: Maryland, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Iowa, Florida, 
Nebraska, Wisconsin, Maine, Texas, California, and Virginia. Id. Although 
these states represent a minority of U.S. jurisdictions, their combined 
populations comprise over 50% of the U.S. population. See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2010, at tbl.13 (2010). 
 114. Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 599, § 8. 
(H.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/CurAllEngDoc/0B97283F997976774
825749F003142D1?OpenDocument. Pursuant to this ordinance, modeled in 
part on MSEHPA, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive in Council may make 
regulations to prevent, combat, or alleviate the effects of a public health 
emergency. Id. Regulations may require: (1) disclosure by individuals of 
information that is relevant to handling the public health emergency; (2) 
disclosure by public officers to the public of information that is relevant to 
handling the public health emergency; (3) requisition of property; and (4) 
“appointment of any person to act as a medical or health professional, the 
control of such appointed person, and deeming such appointed person to be 
registered under any enactment[.]” 
 115. See China’s Shandong Quarantines 23, Declares Health Emergency 
over A/H1N1 Flu, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, May 15, 2009, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/90880/6658293.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 116. Maharashtra Invokes Epidemic Act to Check Swine Flu, DAILY NEWS 
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Delhi,119 and Gujarat120) invoked emergency provisions of their 
respective public health or epidemic disease acts.121 
While these countries’ national and regional emergency 
declarations provide examples of the types of emergency legal 
powers that were instituted in response to H1N1, most WHO 
member countries did not declare any formal state of 
emergency despite WHO’s rapid declaration of a PHEIC. 
Instead, they relied on implementation of national or regional 
pandemic flu plans, use of existing domestic public health laws 
and policies, and guidance from WHO, border countries, and 
others to lead their response efforts. Notable is the divergence 
in legal and policy approaches to pandemic flu responses among 
the majority of WHO member states as contrasted with select 
nations that instituted emergency legal responses. Emergency 
declarations typically authorize countries to respond 
domestically to public health threats in expedited ways. 
Whether public health legal responses among countries that 
declared emergencies exceeded or were more (or less) effective 
in controlling the spread of H1N1 than countries which did not 
                                                 
& ANALYSIS, Aug. 4, 2009, 
http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_maharashtra-invokes-epidemic-act-
to-check-swine-flu_1279630 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) . 
 117. H1N1: TN Govt Bans Home Quarantine, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 13, 
2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/H1N1-TN-govt-bans-
home-quarantine/articleshow/5118134.cms (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) 
(reporting that the Tamil Nadu government used powers under Public Health 
Act to proscribe ineffective health measures like home quarantines). 
 118. Haryana Invokes Epidemic Act, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 11, 2009,  
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Haryana-invokes-Epidemic-
Act/articleshow/4881209.cms (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 119. Epidemic Act in Place but Some Hospitals Fail to Toe Govt Line, 
TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 12, 2009, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Epidemic-Act-in-place-but-some-
hospitals-fail-to-toe-govt-line/articleshow/4887156.cms (last visited Apr. 8, 
2010). 
 120. Modi Govt. Invokes Epidemic Act, as 9 Fresh Cases of H1N1 Reported, 
THAINDIAN NEWS, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india-
news/modi-govt-invokes-epidemic-act-as-9-fresh-cases-of-h1n1-
reported_100235035.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
 121. In another state in India, Andhra Pradesh, it was reported that a man 
died of H1N1 after a private hospital refused to treat him. See Swine Flu 
Death: Notice Served on Hospital, HINDU, Oct. 7, 2009, 
http://www.thehindu.com/2009/10/07/stories/2009100758310300.htm (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2010)  (reporting that authorities at the private hospital have 
been questioned as to why the patient was discharged and not treated after he 
was initially on a ventilator). 
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similarly declare emergencies has not been assessed. 
III. GLOBAL HEALTH LAW IN REAL-TIME 
Legal responses to global health emergencies are 
unpredictable because national emergency laws, even when 
declared, feature different legal approaches and appreciation 
for global responsibilities. The IHRs come as close as possible to 
a “one size fits all” approach to controlling infectious diseases 
that pose significant transnational public health threats. The 
IHRs, however, clearly allow for dissimilar public health 
practices among sovereigns.122 So they must, at least until 
member countries divest their national sovereignty to bestow 
stronger enforcement powers on WHO123 similar to powers 
possessed by the WTO.124 Lacking an enforceable international 
code for all nations as to how to respond in real time, the 
default globally is to defer to specific WHO member countries’ 
emergency and public health laws. This is not always a 
weakness. Though the public health threat of a highly 
communicable virus like H1N1 may not respect boundaries, it 
does not impact countries equally. Industrialized nations with 
sophisticated national health systems may not require the 
same type of public health legal responses to control the spread 
of disease that are needed in developing countries lacking 
resources and personnel to test, screen, and treat individuals. 
To the extent emergency laws focus on flexibility and real-time 
responsiveness, they tend to offer multiple options without 
requiring specific actions.125 Their strength is how they can 
encourage and authorize innovative, non-traditional 
responses;126 their weakness is how their application can lead 
to global injustices, abuses, and confusion during 
emergencies.127 
                                                 
 122. See Fidler, supra note 4. 
 123. Sturtevant et al., supra note 53, at 120 (“Legal enforcement of the IHR 
remains problematic in the absence of sanctions . . . .”). 
 124. See, e.g.,WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 55–58 (4th 
ed. 2008) (explaining that the WTO can impose sanctions on states that do not 
comply with the WTO dispute settlement process). 
 125. See Hodge, supra note 1, at 627–29. 
 126. See Hodge & Anderson, supra note 1, at 272. 
 127. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 2376 (suggesting that the global response 
to H1N1 raises “serious questions of global justice, as Mexicans have become 
subject to stigma and discrimination”). 
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Dissimilarities inherent in sovereign emergency laws are 
not the problem per se until a localized public health threat like 
H1N1 globalizes and requires transnational legal responses. 
National legal responses during the earliest stages of the H1N1 
pandemic may respond to domestic objectives but may also 
devalue the need for global responses in real-time events. The 
ease of transmissibility of conditions like H1N1 in a global 
economy exposes these flaws. Even the strongest national 
public health system capable of initially controlling disease 
within a country’s borders cannot contain threats that arise 
outside its sovereign domain. 
The missing elements underlying the global control of 
infectious diseases like H1N1 is clearly not a lack of national 
legal powers nor a lack of global health strategies. Most 
country’s domestic emergency powers are sufficiently broad to 
address their specific public health objectives, although they 
may be used in invidious ways contrary to public health 
practice. As noted above, the majority of WHO member states 
did not choose to evoke formal emergency powers in response to 
H1N1, relying instead on existing public health powers and 
pandemic flu preparedness plans.  Although “the new IHR[s] 
are no ‘magic bullet’ for global health problems,”128 they do offer 
global standards that most nations respect, at least 
superficially.129 What is truly lacking, however, is the 
willingness and capacity of leaders and other actors nationally 
to implement strategic responses to protect global health in the 
face of emerging international threats. What I define as “global 
legal triage,” refers to efforts of international and national 
leaders and others to identify, prioritize, and solve 
transnational public health legal issues to improve global 
health outcomes in real-time during international 
emergencies.130 
Global legal triage necessitates legal counsel and leaders 
primarily at the international or national levels to generate 
legal solutions to transnational issues that impact global health 
in real-time emergencies. Questions of law and governance 
relating to global allocation of scarce resources and personnel, 
                                                 
 128. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 93. 
 129. Id. (“The revised [IHR] promise to become a centerpiece for global 
health governance in the 21st century.”). 
 130. See supra note 33. 
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limitations on individual travel or entry, or restrictions on 
commerce and trade require strategic responses that reflect 
global health priorities, not just national ones. Addressing 
these global legal challenges in actual emergencies is hampered 
by the altered legal environment inherent in national 
emergency declarations, the exigencies of protecting domestic 
public health, and the entrenchment that occurs when political 
leaders face unsure and potentially catastrophic threats to 
their populations. Primary attention to the public health 
impacts on domestic populations is understandably at the 
center of national efforts. Yet when national legal responses fail 
to match international infectious disease standards set forth in 
the IHRs, public health risks initially addressed in one country 
inevitably transfer to other populations. Countries that 
institute significant emergency response efforts to stymie the 
spread of disease may initially proclaim hollow victories. Over 
the long-term, however, infectious disease “never dies or 
disappears for good.”131 In the case of H1N1, short-sightedness 
in addressing domestic public health concerns to the detriment 
of international health may negatively impact the health of the 
same domestic populations as the virus (in its original or 
mutated form) spreads globally. 
The 2004–2005 SARS epidemic, which motivated 
fundamental reforms to the IHRs,132 provides another example. 
Though aware of the existence of an unknown and potentially 
deadly infectious agent spreading among local populations, 
Chinese authorities initially attempted to withhold surveillance 
data and isolates from WHO and other global partners.133 The 
most favorable interpretation of these failures is that SARS 
was viewed by Chinese authorities as a localized problem that 
posed no threat to others. The more likely view is that China 
                                                 
 131. ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 308 (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1st Vintage 
Intl. ed. 1991) (1948). 
 132. See Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 85 (“The outbreak of [SARS] in 
2003 accelerated the IHR revision process.”). 
 133. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe 
Infectious Disease Threats, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3229, 3233 (2003); accord 
Fidler & Gostin, supra note 52, at 88 (citing DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES (1999)) (“States parties often violated the old 
IHR by failing to report cases  of diseases subject to the Regulations because 
they feared other countries would implement economically damaging trade or 
travel restrictions.”) . 
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intentionally withheld data to avoid the stigma that eventually 
followed, leading to billions of dollars of damages and lost 
revenues as nations and citizens responded by avoiding 
Chinese goods and travel.134 In the end, both China and the 
global health community suffered from this initial, unethical 
decision as SARS spread across China and to multiple other 
countries causing needless morbidity and mortality.135 
The strategic legal goal of pandemic flu response efforts 
cannot be grounded solely in protectionism, but rather must 
adequately prioritize the health of all populations. This is 
particularly relevant in decisions to allocate scarce resources. 
WHO, member countries, and numerous public- and private-
sector entities have issued guidelines on allocating scarce 
resources in emergencies that are grounded in principles of 
justice and fairness.136 Ethical models for emergency-resource 
distributions have been widely proposed.137 To be purposeful, 
these allocation models must be supported by legal principles 
in real-time emergencies.138 For example, even as the United 
States experienced a shortage of available vaccines and 
antivirals in the midst of the H1N1 pandemic and despite some 
oppostion, President Obama pledged donations of existing U.S. 
supplies in mid-September 2009 to global response efforts 
                                                 
 134. See Erik Eckholm, SARS in Beijing: The Unraveling of a Cover-Up, in 
SARS IN CHINA: PRELUDE TO PANDEMIC? 122–32 (Arthur Kleinman & James 
L. Watson eds. 2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS 
AND RESPONSE (2009); FED. OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH, SWISS CONFEDERATION, 
SWISS INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PLAN (2009), available at 
http://www.bag.admin.ch/influenza/01120/01134/03058/index.html?lang=en; 
MASS MEDICAL CARE WITH SCARCE RESOURCES: A COMMUNITY PLANNING 
GUIDE, supra note 35; see also Richard Coker & Sandra Mounier-Jack, 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness in the Asia-Pacific Region, 368 LANCET 886, 
886–89 (2006) (assessing the plans of eight Asia-Pacific countries). 
 137. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic 
Influenza: Ethics and the Law, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 554, 555–56 (2006); 
John L. Hick et al., Clinical Review: Allocating Ventilators During Large-scale 
Disasters–Problems, Planning, and Process, 11 CRITICAL CARE 217, 218–24 
(2007). 
 138. See JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS ET AL., 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ETHICS TO GUIDE ALLOCATION DECISIONS INVOLVING 
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coordinated by WHO.139 Additional countries including 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom similarly 
donated vaccines.140 Though laudable, the objective was not 
just to share vaccines to stymie the spread and impact of the 
disease elsewhere, but also to limit the impact domestically by 
controlling the threat internationally. Only through these types 
of legal decisions, grounded in affirmative foreign relations and 
theories of global justice, will it be possible to circumvent the 
most serious effects of global public health threats like H1N1 in 
the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Facing a novel, albeit relatively mild viral threat in H1N1, 
countries responded in disparate ways, buttressed by 
incongruent emergency laws and decisions as to when, how, or 
if to use them. Whether in ignorance or outright refusal, 
countries’ legal and public health responses did not always 
conform to WHO’s guidance through its invocation of the IHRs. 
Proven public health interventions were negated. Human 
rights abuses arose. Economic impacts were realized. And 
H1N1 influenza spread like wildfire. This first major test of the 
global health system in the face of a global health threat does 
not bode well for future outbreaks. 
Threats like H1N1 or other highly communicable diseases 
cannot be completely snuffed out through existing, or likely 
future, global health initiatives. We still cannot prevent 
pandemics that arise naturally as part of organized society. 
However, when disease spreads because of failures in global 
health strategies inhibited by legal principles of national 
sovereignty and limited views of the roles of government to 
                                                 
 139. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Shortage of Vaccine Poses Political Test for 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009 at A4; Press Release, The White House, 
President Announces Plan to Expand Fight Against Global H1N1 Pandemic 
(Sept. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Announces-Plan-to-
Expand-Fight-Against-Global-H1N1-Pandemic/ (promising 10% of U.S. 
vaccine supply to global distribution efforts). 
 140. See, e.g., Meagan Fitzpatrick, Canada to Donate H1N1 Vaccine to the 
WHO, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.canada.com/business/Canada+donate+H1N1+vaccine/2494564/stor
y.html. 
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protect only domestic populations, society can no longer blame 
a virus completely for its human and economic losses. Not all 
governments must respond alike to pandemic threats. To the 
contrary, public health threats impact populations differently 
depending on multiple factors. Rather, when they respond 
legally, they must be mindful of the global health impacts of 
their decisions. Tepid acceptance of international disease 
control standards like the IHRs are insufficient. Countries 
must not only embrace global health goals in response to 
pandemic threats but also act consistent with them. The dual 
global health legal challenges of this century are (1) to reform 
public health laws at every level of government to better reflect 
shared, global objectives, and (2) then be prepared to apply 
them through the practice of global legal triage. 
 
